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Abstract in asia the rise of both China and india is becoming a reality. Their growth is 
of an unprecedented scale. while the uS continues to be the only superpower, it needs 
the help of like-minded countries to deal with international challenges. Beyond 2030, 
the G3—the uS, China and india as the pillars of a tri-polar world—may become a real-
ity. in order to cope with changes of this magnitude, increased cooperation between the 
uS, Europe and democracies in asia is essential. To be successful in adopting this new 
strategic landscape, it is necessary to strengthen the ties between Europe and democ-
racies in asia. in this regard, rule-making is the key area for success. Japan is  
contributing to these efforts by applying a comprehensive engagement policy towards 
China while strengthening its alliance with the uS. Establishing strategic ties with india 
is also important. Japan and Europe can do much to help achieve stability. after all, 
Japan needs a strong and engaging Europe, just as Europe needs a strong and active 
Japan.
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Introduction
This article describes the basic framework for a survival strategy for Japan for the com-
ing 15–20 years. i will first show how Japan analyses major regional and global trends. 
Then i will outline a description of a basic global framework that is capable of coping 
with these major trends. Following this, i will clarify Japan’s fundamental choices in 
response to these trends. Finally, i will argue that Europe is relevant to our common 
endeavour to deal with these major changes. i will approach this by exploring the poten-
tial areas of cooperation between Japan and Europe.
What is happening?
what is predicted for the future basically dictates how one formulates what should be 
done to prepare for it. There are many factors that should be taken into consideration 
in predicting the future, but they are too numerous to be described in full in this paper. 
Thus, i will focus on the most crucial ones.
The unprecedented magnitude of the rising powers
in the past, we have seen the impact of rising powers on international affairs. But what 
we are witnessing currently is quite different from the past in terms of scale. in short, 
both China and india are rising powers. This means that 2.5 billion people, or one-third 
of the world’s population, live in countries that are growing in power. This inevitably 
needs to be reflected by adjustments to the world order. in order for long-term peace-
ful and prosperous coexistence with these huge rising powers, the so-called status quo 
powers should adjust the existing global frameworks or rules by taking into considera-
tion their perspectives.
However, at the same time, there should be some basic rules which should not be 
changed. For example, a state should not unilaterally change the status quo by force or 
coercion. it sounds obvious, but sometimes this rule is ignored. The above-mentioned 
‘adjustment’ act should be coupled with efforts to establish a consensus on what the 
fundamental rules for all are.
Bipolar, multipolar or not polar at all?
i belong to the school of thought that believes that the uS will remain the only super-
power, if it is one today, until at least 2030 (see below). This is not only because the 
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GDp of the uS is still almost twice as large as China’s and its defence spending about 
three times larger, but also because the uS is one of the few developed countries 
where the population is projected to continue to grow. The present population of the 
uS, about 300 million, is predicted to become 400 million around 2040, and this will 
keep the american frontier spirit going. However, the relative supremacy of the uS is 
destined to decline. at the same time, there are a variety of challenges which the uS, 
even at its mightiest, cannot solve by itself. These include terrorism, climate change, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and so on. The uS is still a necessary part 
of the solution but it is no longer a sufficient part of it. This means that the uS needs 
support, particularly from its allies and like-minded countries.
Does beyond 2030 mean the G3?
Last but not least, let me extend the range of projection to cover possible developments 
beyond 2030. The year 2030 will be an interesting one. it is foreseen that around that 
year, several symbolic events are likely to happen. First, China’s GDp may become 
larger than that of the uS. This does not mean that the Chinese people will become as 
wealthy as americans, but it will have a huge symbolic impact. Second, the defence 
budget of China may reach similar levels to that of the uS. again, this does not mean 
that the Chinese military will be as capable as that of the uS, but it will be seen as 
another symbolic factor. Third, in 2030, india is projected to have the world’s largest 
population, about 1.5 billion, surpassing that of China, while the decline of the Chinese 
population will slowly begin. The concept of the G2, consisting of the uS and China, has 
often been discussed. But if the above projection is correct, by the time China becomes 
strong enough to squarely face the uS, india will have joined the superpower club. in 
other words, there may not be a G2 but there will certainly be a G3 (the uS, China and 
india), and our long-term planning should take this probability into consideration.
Dealing with a new world order
These trends will inevitably bring about dramatic changes in the global power balance in 
due course. So, the next question is how can we cope with these trends without causing 
dramatic disorder?
The reality is that if you look around, there are only three poles in the world which are 
both capable of working to achieve global stability and willing to do so. They are the uS, 
Europe and the democracies in asia, including Japan, australia and the republic of 
Korea, among others. The key to stability is to establish the closest possible coordina-
tion and cooperation among these three poles.
in this regard, the uS and Europe have created naTo, while the uS and asian 
democracies have created a series of bilateral alliances. This means that the weakest 
link in this cooperation is between Europe and the democracies in asia. if we succeed 
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in realising closer coordination and cooperation between the two, it will represent a net 
plus in terms of the capability to create a more stable world.
in more concrete terms, the most important and indispensable issue is rule-making. 
Even though interests and political systems differ from one country to another, it is 
essential to have common rules in order to establish a peaceful and mutually beneficial 
coexistence. rules equal more predictability and transparency. we should be able to 
adjust the existing rules by taking into consideration the perspectives of the rising pow-
ers. if this is not done, it may result in there being constant tension between us and 
them. However, at the same time, there are a few key factors that need to be borne in 
mind.
First, we need to distinguish what should not be changed from what can be adjusted. 
in this regard, why do Crimea and ukraine matter to Japan? why is Japan party to 
the international sanctions regime? it is because this incident touches on one of the 
fundamental rules that should be globally respected: that the status quo should not be 
changed unilaterally by force or coercion. This should not only be the case in Europe 
but in asia too. another fundamental rule is pacta sunt servanda, meaning that states 
must abide by what is agreed. if a state agrees and ratifies international agreements, it 
must honour them. a state cannot just ignore treaties and the procedures therein that 
have been agreed to. if rules as fundamental as the above examples are not secured, 
we cannot effectively assure stability.
Second, when adjusting the existing rules or creating new ones, like-minded countries 
should reach a consensus on minimum standards. The asian infrastructure investment 
Bank (aiiB) is one of the latest examples of rule-making. The competition of new ideas 
is in itself a good and healthy thing. what is important is whether the rules applied to 
the new ideas meet basic global standards. in the case of the aiiB, the rules relate to 
environmental protection, the avoidance of corruption and so on. The problem was that 
there was no coordination of consensus building over these standards among the sta-
tus quo powers before some of the European countries announced their participation. it 
is not yet clear, even now that a basic agreement has been reached among the found-
ing members, whether global standards will be secured in practice. The aiiB is only the 
beginning; there will certainly be more new ideas to come. we have learned a lot of les-
sons this time, and we are determined to do a better job in the future.
Lastly, in rule-making, who takes the lead and in what kind of international framework 
is of crucial importance. There can be many different approaches depending on the 
situation but, when it comes to regional rule-making, the East asia Summit (EaS) 
seems to be the best platform among the existing regional institutions. This is simply 
because it involves almost all the important regional players: the 10 member countries 
of the association of Southeast asian nations, Japan, China, the republic of Korea, 
australia, new Zealand and india, plus the uS and russia. Japan is open to discussing 
any issues, whether they be security-related or economic, within the EaS. For exam-
ple, in relation to the ongoing challenges in the South China Sea, including territorial 
disputes, unlawful reclamation and unilateral militarisation, the EaS is a good platform 
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to talk about not only confidence-building measures but also practical arrangements 
to ensure mishaps are avoided, such as fishery agreements and crisis management 
mechanisms. Because the uS, india and China—the potential parties of the G3—are all 
members of the EaS, it is the perfect platform for future regional economic integration. 
Japan will continue to make every effort to make the EaS more relevant and useful.
What should Japan do?
what should Japan’s basic policy choice be? and what should Japan do to achieve its 
policy goals? in this section i argue that, based upon the above assessment, the funda-
mental choices that Japan has made will remain valid until around 2030.
Basic strategic choices
There are only a few things that cannot be changed and a country’s geographical posi-
tion is one of them. Japan is destined to live as a neighbour of China. Historically, China 
has been much bigger, more advanced and more prosperous than Japan. our basic 
task has been and will continue to be to establish a peaceful and mutually beneficial 
coexistence with China while maintaining our independence and, to put it casually, with-
out being told what to do.
in the post–Second world war environment, Japan made two fundamental choices: 
to form an alliance with the uS and to coexist peacefully and prosperously with China 
through the application of a comprehensive engagement policy. as assumed above, if 
the uS continues to remain the only superpower until around 2030, Japan’s two funda-
mental choices will remain valid until around 2030 as well.
However, it is also true, as pointed out above, that the relative supremacy of the uS is 
in decline and there are also many challenges that the uS cannot solve by itself. There-
fore, it makes sense for the allies of the uS to do more to maintain the effectiveness of 
their alliances. one of the major elements in that regard is to establish closer strategic 
ties with india, which is predicted to become one of the G3 at some point after 2030.
Comprehensive engagement with China
Japan’s clear policy objective is a peaceful and prosperous coexistence with China. it 
is inevitable that there will be some issues and challenges between big neighbours, but 
these can be managed with wisdom from both sides, as has been the case for the past 
few thousand years. it is always wise to have a crisis management mechanism in place 
as well, and there are plenty of efforts being made to that end between the two.
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in fact, Japan and China have many interests in common, including economic 
exchange. China has been Japan’s number one trading partner since 2007. The envi-
ronment is another interest shared by China and Japan. whatever happens in China’s 
environment will have impact on Japan, and Japan has every incentive to cooperate 
with China in tackling regional environmental challenges.
on matters of energy security and the safety and freedom of navigation we also share 
common interests. Japan and China are both major energy consumers and definitely 
favour value for money. we share the same sea lines of communication (SLoC) from the 
persian Gulf through the indian ocean and the Strait of Malacca into the South and East 
China Sea. nobody appreciates heightened tension in these SLoC. This is true not only for 
Japan but also for others using the same SLoC, including European countries and China.
it also makes sense that whenever China is ready to become part of the solution to 
challenges of a global scale, we should welcome it. The latest good example is Chi-
na’s increasing involvement in peacekeeping operations in africa. in South Sudan, 350 
peacekeepers from the Japanese Self Defence Force are working side by side with 700 
peacekeepers from the Chinese infantry division. Europeans know very well that there 
is an increasing number of ‘fragile states’ in africa and unless something is done to 
change their fate, they will become an even more significant source of refugees and 
extremism. The earlier the engagement, the better, and Europe should be prepared to 
use whatever help exists and is useful.
Alliance with the US
Beyond all that has been said thus far, it is always wise to be prepared for the worst 
case scenario. a comprehensive engagement policy should include policies for pro-
tecting Japan under the worst possible circumstances. Here the alliance with the uS 
is essential. History shows that the better you are prepared for crises, the less chance 
there is of crises happening. obviously, the Japan–uS alliance is not only in place for 
the defence of Japan but also to ensure the stability of the entire region and to face 
such challenges as those that the Democratic people’s republic of Korea poses. it 
makes sense to strengthen the capability of the alliance with the uS.
Japan and the uS have continuously improved the interoperability and the level of 
readiness of their alliance. Supporting the smooth forward deployment of uS forces is 
another priority. Since uS forward deployment is increasingly rotational in nature, not 
only in asia but also throughout the indian ocean, Europe and africa, this involves mak-
ing the effort to network among like-minded countries en route.
it is symbolic that the notion of ‘hub and spokes’ which used to be used to describe 
the security framework in asia is no longer relevant and that ‘networking’ is the latest 
concept. rather than having the uS–Japan and the uS–australia alliance operating 
side by side, we should establish a network (or trilateral security cooperation) between 
the uS, Japan and australia, by promoting security cooperation between the allies of 
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the uS. Such cooperation used to be non-existent, but the growing level and scale of 
interoperability was demonstrated after the Great East Japan Earthquake, when not 
only the uS but also the australian armed forces played a major role in supporting dis-
aster-hit areas. we would very much like to further strengthen the Japan–uS–republic 
of Korea network as well.
Last but not least, Japan has made a reasonable effort to improve its capabilities. The 
establishment of a national Security Council together with a national Security Strategy 
has made it possible for not only faster and more effective but also more transparent 
and predictable decisions to be made. The recent enactment of the new legislation for 
peace and security is another example of the efforts being made.
Establish strategic ties with India
For Japan, it makes sense, in more than one way, to establish strategic ties with india. 
india shares the same values as Japan. india is situated very strategically in the middle 
of the SLoC which Japan uses and it plays a key role in maintaining the security and 
freedom of navigation throughout the indian ocean. india is a growing market where 
there are a lot of opportunities for mutually beneficial economic interaction.
Many efforts have been made to promote bilateral relations. To strengthen the stra-
tegic partnership between the two countries through frequent coordination at the top, 
prime Minister abe travelled to india in January 2014.  This was followed by a visit from 
prime Minister Modi to Japan in august 2014. abe visited india again in December 2015. 
They also meet at multilateral meetings such as the EaS or G20. They are very close.
There is also another win–win example of networking here. The Japan–uS–india 
trilateral mechanism is well-established. Through it, issues of mutual interest are dis-
cussed, including maritime security, terrorism and the global economy. The navies of 
the three countries have already carried out joint exercises twice. This trilateral mecha-
nism will increasingly continue to promote the strategic partnership.
What can Japan and Europe do together?
Finally, what can Japan and Europe do together? as mentioned above, Japan and 
Europe are two of the three poles which are both capable of and willing to work for 
global stability, and the closer our coordination and cooperation are, the better the 
chances of success. Below, i will touch upon some examples of ways in which we can 
interact.
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Share visions for common security challenges
Sometimes, a flat map can be deceptive. asia is closer than it feels to Europe, even in 
a geographic sense. in fact, all major European capitals are closer to asia than wash-
ington, DC or new York. north Korean missiles that can reach the continental uS can 
also reach Europe. needless to say, russia not only has a European border but also 
an asian one. Europeans use the same SLoC for trade as their asian counterparts. in 
short, our destinies are intertwined.
Therefore, we need to have a more enhanced exchange of views about incidents that 
happen not only in Europe or the Middle East but also in asia. we would also like to 
hear more from Europe about its views on critical issues in asia, such as what is hap-
pening in the South China Sea. it would be great to clearly hear European perspectives, 
for example when the outcome of the arbitration case between the philippines and 
China is released. after all, this relates to the rule of law, which has global implications.
Act jointly to promote common security interests
our cooperation can make a difference in many areas where common security interests 
are involved. These include the fight against terrorism, anti-piracy operations, coordi-
nating endeavours to protect and promote the use of cyberspace, and so on. one of 
the areas of particular importance currently is maritime security. To keep our common 
SLoC safe and free, there may be a rationale for joint exercises at a mid-point between 
asia and Europe, such as in the indian ocean, to prepare for potential future joint oper-
ations. a practical way to move forward would be for some European countries to join 
the Japan–uS–india naval exercises mentioned above.
Realise the indirect links between our interests and help 
each other
The example i have in mind here is to help improve the situation in the fragile states in 
africa mentioned above. Japan is ready to help where we can make a difference. our 
participation in South Sudan is an example of this. Because this issue has the potential 
to become more critical in the near future, Europe should enhance its engagement and 
be willing to use all available help, including any offered by China.
Conclusion
in short, my conclusion is that Japan needs a strong and engaged Europe; i believe that 
Europe needs a strong and active Japan as well. There are many areas where we can 
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cooperate to make sure that this will continue to be the case—such cooperation is des-
perately needed at this time.
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